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Abstract 
 
Many  products  are  manufactured  in  networks  of  firms  linked  by  transactions,  but 
comparatively little is known about how or why such transaction networks differ. This paper 
investigates the transaction networks of two large sectors in Japan at a single point in time. In 
characterizing  these  networks,  our  primary  measure  is  “hierarchy,”  defined  as  the  degree to 
which  transactions  flow  in  one  direction,  from  “upstream”  to  “downstream.”  Our  empirical 
results  show  that  the  electronics  sector  exhibits  a  much  lower  degree  of  hierarchy  than  the 
automotive  sector  because  of  the  presence  of  numerous  inter-firm  transaction  cycles.  These 
cycles,  in  turn,  reveal that  a  significant  group  of  firms  have  two-way  “vertically  permeable 
boundaries”:  (1)  they  participate  in  multiple  stages  of  an  industry’s  value  chain,  hence  are 
vertically integrated, but also (2) they allow both downstream units to purchase intermediate 
inputs from and upstream units to sell intermediate goods to other sector firms. We demonstrate 
that the 10 largest electronics firms had two-way vertically permeable boundaries while almost 
no firms in the automotive sector had adopted that practice. 
 
Keywords: transactions; networks; vertical integration; hierarchy; industry architecture; 
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1 Introduction 
Transactions are the most basic form of inter-firm relationship and are a fundamental unit 
of economic analysis (Commons, 1934; Williamson, 1975; 1985). Inspired by the seminal work 
of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975; 1985), a great deal of scholarly work has sought over the 
last three decades to explain transactions and the boundaries of firms. Until recently, however, 
the literature in both management and economics has focused on dyadic relationships between 
upstream sellers and downstream buyers.   
But many products today are produced in networks spanning many firms (Powell, 1990; 
Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Sturgeon, 2002). Thus a growing body of research has been 
conducted at the level of an industry sector, in which “sector” is defined as a group of firms that 
collectively design and produce a coherent set of system products (Malerba, 2002). (Sectors have 
also been called “value networks,” “modular production networks,” and, more recently, 
“ecosystems.”) Theorists, in turn, have suggested that sectors have “architectures,” defined as the 
“rules and roles” that guide participants’ expectations and the resulting division of labor across 
firms (Jacobides et al., 2006). When a new sector emerges, a range of architectures may be 
viable. But soon after, product definitions will be established; transactions will become 
standardized; and the sector’s architecture will assume a stable form. 
Sector architectures are known to vary over time and across product types, but 
comparatively little is known about how and why they differ. This paper aims to extend the 
empirical and theoretical work on sector architectures by investigating the transaction networks 
of two large sectors in Japan at a single point in time. In characterizing these networks, our 
primary measure is “hierarchy,” defined as the degree to which transactions in the network flow 
in one direction, from “upstream” to “downstream.” Our empirical results show that the 
electronics sector exhibits a much lower degree of hierarchy than the automotive sector because 
it contains numerous inter-firm transaction cycles. 
We also show that the absence of hierarchy in a transaction network can reveal a key fact 
about firm behavior: the presence of a significant group of firms that have two-way “vertically 
permeable boundaries” (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006). Such firms exhibit two characteristics: 
(1) they participate in multiple stages of industry value chains and hence are vertically 
integrated, but also (2) they purchase inputs from and sell products to other firms in the sector. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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We demonstrate that the largest electronics firms had two-way vertically permeable boundaries 
while almost no firms in the automotive sector had adopted that practice. 
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on industry architecture in several ways. 
We believe we are the first to conduct a formal cross-sector comparative analysis of transaction 
networks. Furthermore, to implement our analysis, we used a measure of hierarchy that can be 
applied to any transaction network. We are also among the first to link differences in architecture 
at the sector level to specific practices by firms within that sector. Our work thus shows how the 
strategies and decisions of firms at the micro-level give rise to observable architectural 
differences between sectors at the macro-level.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes how we measure the hierarchy of a network. Section 4 presents our 
data and empirical results. Section 5 explains how boundary choices by the largest firms in each 
sector give rise to different network patterns at the sector level. Section 6 discusses our results. 
Lastly, section 7 concludes by describing this paper’s contributions, limitations, and future 
research directions. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Prior research on transactions has focused on the boundaries of the firm and related 
strategies, such as “make or buy” or vertical integration versus specialization. Because the 
literature in this area is vast, we are not able to do it justice here. (See Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007 for a useful survey.) Instead we provide a selective review divided into three parts: (1) 
firm-level studies, (2) sector-level studies, and (3) transaction-network studies. 
 
Firm-Level Studies 
Most empirical studies of transactions at the firm level investigate the make-or-buy 
decisions of a single firm or the bilateral relationships between customers and suppliers in a 
particular industry. It has been shown that firms are more likely to outsource components when 
their assets are not co-specialized, when the component interfaces are standardized, and when 
high-powered incentives or property rights improve performance (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). 
In particular, component modularity coupled with high rates of component innovation may THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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motivate firms to specialize in particular segments of the value chain and can lead to vertical 
disintegration (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005).   
However, firms that bring together diverse knowledge bases may enjoy a competitive 
advantage in designing and producing complex system-level products (Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2001). Thus Davies (2004) and Ceci and Masini (2011) found that large IT firms maintain a 
broad spectrum of capabilities along the value chain in order to offer integrated solutions to their 
customers. Furthermore, if the locus of technological innovation alternates between components 
and systems (Fine, 1998; Christensen, et al., 2002), vertically integrated firms may survive and 
prosper in the long run, even if they suffer during periods of intense component-level innovation 
(Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010). Empirically, Strojwas (2005) and Kapoor (2011) have 
shown that, in the U.S. semiconductor industry, both vertically integrated and specialized firms 
obtain adequate returns on capital over the business cycle. Empirical evidence from Japan also 
suggests that, despite high levels of component modularity and innovation, the largest Japanese 
electronics firms have remained vertically integrated, maintaining both systems and component 
divisions within their corporate boundaries (Luo, 2010, pp.114-5).   
Firm-level studies also demonstrate that “make or buy” is not a clean dichotomy. In 
addition to purchasing components via arms-length transactions and making them in-house, 
firms frequently enter long-term relational contracts with their suppliers (Sako, 1992; Gulati 
1995). Furthermore, many firms practice “concurrent sourcing,” or “tapered integration”; that is, 
they both purchase a given component from external suppliers and make it in-house (Harrigan, 
1985; Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). Firms also practice “concurrent 
selling,” in which upstream divisions both supply components to downstream divisions and sell 
them to external customers. For example, Jacobides and Billinger (2006) describe a clothing 
manufacturer that changed its strategy to allow upstream units to sell and downstream units to 
buy intermediate goods from other firms in its sector. The company thus went from being purely 
vertically integrated to having so-called “vertically permeable boundaries.” Below we will show 
that this practice at the firm level can affect the architecture of transaction networks at the sector 
level.   
 
Sector-Level Studies 
Another set of studies looks at networks of firms whose relationships and boundaries THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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co-evolve over time (Powell, 1990; Langlois and Robertson, 1992). In that literature, such 
groupings are variously called “sectors,” “value networks,” “modular production networks,” and, 
recently, “ecosystems” (Malerba, 2002; Jacobides et al. 2006; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 
1995; Sturgeon, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010). To avoid confusion, 
this paper will consistently use the term “sector.” An example is the automobile sector, which 
includes firms making finished products (that is, entire vehicles) in addition to those making 
sub-systems such as engines or interiors, components such as pistons or seats, and materials such 
as glass, plastic, and steel. 
Within a sector, transactions in intermediate markets serve to link and coordinate 
complementary activities across firms (Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Dalziel, 2007; Baldwin, 
2008; Adner and Kapoor, 2010). A number of studies at the sector level have explored how the 
internal boundaries of industries change and how intermediate markets emerge or disappear 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005; Fixson and Park, 2008). Drawing on the engineering 
and product design literatures, Jacobides et al. (2006) defined “industry architecture” as a 
somewhat stable but evolving set of relationships that organize production and innovation 
processes in a sector. These relationships set the patterns by which labor and assets are divided 
among different types of firms, and the associated set of “rules and roles” that guide firms’ 
behavior in the short and intermediate term. Sector architectures vary because different 
knowledge bases and evolutionary pathways lead to different specific constraints and 
opportunities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1984; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Dosi, 1988; 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993, 1996, 1997; Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Castellacci, 2007).   
The application of formal network methods to the analysis of sectors offers a new 
challenge and opportunity for scholars. This has resulted in a growing body of literature aimed at 
understanding inter-firm networks in general and their effects on firm performance (Gulati, 1995, 
1998; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
Of particular note is a recent comparative study by Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) of the 
alliance networks in 32 industries in the United States. Interestingly, data on alliances and other 
knowledge-sharing ties (e.g., patent citations and career paths) are often accessible to scholars, 
while data on transactions are usually closely guarded by firms. Consequently, most sector-level 
network studies have looked at networks that transfer knowledge between firms rather than those 
that transfer goods via transactions.   THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Transaction network analysis provides a different lens through which to view industry 
architectures and perform cross-sector comparisons. In the field of economic sociology, 
transaction networks have recently become the focus of theory, data collection, and quantitative 
analysis, but this emerging research stream has not been linked directly to the industry 
architecture literature. We address this gap in the next subsection. 
 
Transaction-Network Studies and the Concept of Hierarchy 
Scholars in economic sociology have studied transaction networks in “production 
markets,” which are defined as markets for manufactured or processed goods (H. White, 2002a). 
According to Harrison White (2002b: 87), production markets show “persistent directionality in 
continuing flows of intermediate goods,” in which “only a niche within an industry establishes 
you in a line of business.” 
Formally, a hierarchy is a structure in which entities such as firms are ordered or ranked 
with respect to a specific relationship (Ahl and Allen, 1996). Under this definition, networks in 
which firms are strictly ordered with respect to transactions (A sells to B, which sells to C, etc.) 
are hierarchies. Following the lead of H. White (2002a, b), Nakano and D. White (2007) studied 
the transaction network of firms in the Tokyo industrial district and showed that it exhibits strict 
hierarchy. They hypothesized that hierarchy is a general property of production markets because 
firms tend to become entrenched in their co-specialized positions and their roles as buyers and 
sellers. If each firm in a sector is purely focused on a single stage of the value chain, then 
transaction flows will mirror the flow of goods through the stages of production and the resulting 
transaction network will be hierarchical. Their hypothesis, however, was based on the analysis of 
a single network. 
 
To summarize, firm-level studies suggest that transactions take many different forms and 
include complex practices such as relational contracts, concurrent sourcing (or tapered 
integration), and two-way vertically permeable boundaries. Sector-level studies, in turn, focus on 
networks of related firms and describe stable and recurring patterns in the flows of goods and 
knowledge within a sector. Formal network methods have been used to study flows of 
knowledge but, because of data limitations, transactions and flows of goods have not received as 
much attention. Finally, economic sociologists have begun to investigate transaction networks THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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and have suggested that “persistent directionality” or “hierarchy” might be a property of 
networks that produce tangible goods. But at this point in time, they have not yet undertaken 
cross-sector comparisons.   
This paper builds on and extends the prior literature in several ways. First, to enable 
cross-sector comparisons, we propose a formal way to measure hierarchy that can be applied to 
any transaction network. Then, building on previous sector-level studies, we analyze the 
transaction networks of two industry sectors at one point in time and show that their hierarchical 
network architectures differ significantly. That finding is then traced back to differences in the 
practices of the largest firms in each sector. To begin our analysis, we describe our measure of 
hierarchy. 
 
3 Measuring Hierarchy in the Architecture of Transaction Networks 
Although there is reason to suspect that hierarchy may vary across sectors, it has been 
difficult to detect and justify “how hierarchical” a network is, or to determine whether one 
network is “more hierarchical” than another. Recently, Luo and Magee (2011) have developed 
an approach for quantifying hierarchy in general networks. Their measure makes it possible to 
quantify hierarchical degree and thus objectively compare the architecture of transaction 
networks in different sectors. In the following, we briefly outline the method and provide an 
intuitive understanding of it. 
At the most general level, transaction networks can be represented as directed graphs in 
which the nodes are firms and the links are transactions. Within a network, hierarchy is a generic 
structure in which the nodes are ordered with respect to their linkages. Flow hierarchy
1  in a 
transaction network arises when there is a directional order of transactions from firm to firm 
through a series of stages (from “upstream” to “downstream”). In other words, if A sells to B, 
which sells to C, then A, B, and C form a hierarchy with respect to those transactions.   
But it is also possible for transaction networks to have cycles, in which A sells to B, 
which sells to A, either directly or indirectly. Cycles violate the principle of hierarchy because 
flows come back to their origin. Building on this fact, Luo and Magee (2011) have proposed to 
                                                 
1  Flow hierarchy is distinguished from other types of hierarchy, such as organizational hierarchy, status hierarchy, 
or nested hierarchy (Simon, 1962; Ahl and Allen, 1996). THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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measure the degree of hierarchy in a network by capturing the extent to which it contains cycles. 
Their hierarchy metric (h) is calculated as the percentage of links that are not included in any 
cycle: 
 
 
1
m
i
i
e
h
m
 

 
             (1) 
where m is the number of links in the network and ei=0 if link i is in a cycle and 1 otherwise.
2,3 
In general, this metric categorizes transaction networks into three canonical architectures: 
(1) Purely hierarchical (single-directional transaction flow), h=1; 
(2) Purely cyclic (every transaction is part of a cycle), h=0; and 
(3) Partially hierarchical (sequence and cycle are combined), 0<h<1. 
In the next section, we use this metric to compare the transaction networks of two 
industrial sectors in Japan. 
 
4 Data and Empirical Results 
In this section we apply the hierarchy metric and existing network visualization tools to 
the transaction data from the Japanese automotive and electronics sectors. We conduct a 
cross-sector comparative analysis and examine whether hierarchy varies between the sectors. 
Based on this analysis, we are able to reject the hypothesis that hierarchy is a general property of 
production markets (Nakano and D. White, 2007). 
 
4.1 Data 
We extracted supplier-customer transactional relationship data from the series data books 
“The Structure of the Japanese Auto Part Industry” and “The Structure of the Japanese 
                                                 
2  In some applications, it is useful to weight the links by, for example, the volume of flows. However, in this paper 
we focus on unweighted networks because our empirical data do not include complete information about the weights 
of all the links. In addition, this metric only counts whether a link is involved in any cycle but does not take into 
account the lengths of cycles. Completely tracing cycle sizes is computationally difficult when networks are large 
and adds little insight. 
3  This metric is advantageous in its clarity and ease of computation in comparison to other potential metrics. It has 
wide applicability in other network systems, such as organizations, teams, and products. For details on this metric, 
including the algorithm to calculate it for large-scale networks, see Luo (2010, chapters 2 and 3) and Luo and Magee 
(2011). THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Electronics Industry,” which are based on regular surveys by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. 
The company directories in these two data books provide information on the major customers 
and suppliers for each firm. Such information allowed us to extract “who-supplies-whom” 
connections between firms,
4  which then enabled us to build the transaction networks for those 
two sectors. The data books were available only in hard copy and had to be manually entered 
into an electronic database. For the automotive sector, we had access to data books published in 
1983, 1993, and 2001; for the electronics sector, we unfortunately had access to just one data 
book published in 1993.
5  Thus our cross-sector comparison focuses on 1993. (Even though our 
comparative analysis focuses on just 1993, we present two other years of data from the 
automotive sector as a stability check to show that fundamental patterns were stable in that sector 
over an 18-year period. Unfortunately, a similar stability check was not possible for the 
electronics industry. We discuss this limitation in the conclusion.) 
The two sectors are similar on some dimensions but not on others. Both manufacture 
complex physical products; hence they qualify as “production markets” under H. White’s 
(2002a) definition. Both are located within the same national and cultural setting but differ 
substantially in terms of their key technologies and knowledge bases. Table 1 lists the largest 10 
firms by revenue in 1993 for the two sectors and also reports the numbers of suppliers and 
customers for each firm. Overall, the largest firms in each sector also had the largest number of 
suppliers. (The overlap between the largest 10 firms by revenue and by number of suppliers was 
100% in the automotive sector and 90% -- a one-firm discrepancy -- in the electronics sector.) 
With respect to customers, there was a notable difference between the two sectors. In the 
automotive sector, the largest firms had no customers within the sector, while some of the largest 
electronics firms (Matsushita Electric, Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, and Fujitsu) also had the highest 
numbers of customers. (These differences will be analyzed in greater detail in section 5.1.)   
 
                                                 
4  We do not have details on the specifics of individual transactions. 
5  We believe the data actually represent the situation approximately two to three years before the publishing year, 
because the publications were refreshed every two to three years. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Table 1 The largest 10 firms in the automotive and electronics sectors in Japan in 1993 
  Largest 10 Firms  Year Ending  Revenue 
(Billion Yen) 
Number of   
Suppliers 
Number of 
Customers** 
A
u
t
om
o
t
iv
e
 N
e
t
w
o
r
k
  Toyota Motor  June 1993  9,031  166  0 
Nissan Motor  March 1993  3,897  176  0 
Honda Motor  March 1993  2,695  169  0 
Mitsubishi Motors  March 1993  2,615  226  0 
Mazda Motor  March 1993  2,191  157  0 
Isuzu Motors  October 1993  1,199  135  0 
Suzuki Motor  March 1993  1,053  125  0 
Fuji Heavy Industries  March 1993  873  127  0 
Daihatsu Motor  March 1993  785  99  0 
Hino Motors  March 1993  632  98  0 
E
le
c
t
r
o
n
ic
s N
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
 
Hitachi  March 1992  7,766  52  17 
Matsushita Electric Industrial*  March 1992  7,450  30  27 
Toshiba  March 1992  4,722  40  26 
Sony  March 1992  3,915  36  3 
NEC  March 1992  3,744  38  18 
Fujitsu  March 1992  3,422  34  12 
Mitsubishi Electric  March 1992  3,343  33  7 
Canon  December 1991  1,869  9  2 
Sanyo Electric  November 1991  1,616  15  3 
Sharp  March 1992  1,555  23  3 
* Matsushita Electric Industrial was renamed to Panasonic Corporation in 2008. 
  ** “Customers” are within the sector and do not include end-users. 
 
For each sector in a specific year, we constructed a directed network in which nodes are 
firms and links are supplier-customer transactional relationships. The transactions indicated are 
compensated transactions of physical products and not services or intellectual property. Table 2 
contains basic network statistics, including number of firms (n), number of transactional 
relationships (m), and average degree
6  (k=m/n). The automotive transaction networks have more 
nodes, more links, and a higher average degree than the electronics transaction network. 
 
                                                 
6  In graph theory, the degree of a node means the number of nodes connected to it. In a directed network, there are 
two types of degrees applying to a single node: in-degree (number of nodes connected to it) and out-degree (number 
of nodes it connects to). The average in-degree and out-degree of a network are equal. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Table 2 Network descriptive statistics 
Network Attributes  Japanese Automotive Sector 
Japanese 
Electronics 
Sector 
Year  1983  1993  2001  1993 
Number of Firms (n)  356  679  627  227 
Number of Transactional 
Relationships (m)  1480  2437  2175  648 
Average Degree (k=m/n)  4.157  3.589  3.469  2.855 
 
 
With these basic statistics in hand, we now analyze each sector’s transaction network 
using standard network tools in addition to our hierarchy metric. In the subsections that follow, 
we present graphical visualizations, matrix visualizations, hierarchy metric calculations, and an 
analysis of embedded cycles for the two networks. 
 
4.2 Graphical Visualization   
We used Netdraw, a leading social-network visualization program (Borgatti, 2002), to 
create graphical images of the transaction networks in the automotive and electronics sectors in 
1993. The visualizations (Figure 1) allow us to see that the automotive network has more nodes 
and links and that both networks contain a number of “hubs” (nodes with many links). Both 
networks are also densely connected, displaying what Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) call a 
“spiderweb” structure. Although informative, such diagrams are not designed to reveal the 
presence of hierarchy or cycles. 
 THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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       A) Automotive Sector                                 B) Electronics Sector 
Figure 1 Japanese interfirm transaction networks in 1993 
 
 
4.3 Matrix Visualization 
Matrices are better than graphs at revealing flow hierarchies in networks. In engineering, 
a square Design Structure Matrix (DSM) is often used to examine the dependencies between 
design elements or communication linkages between designers (Eppinger et al., 1994; Sosa et al., 
2004; MacCormack et al., 2006). Generalizing these procedures, we used a square DSM to 
examine the pattern of linkages between firms in the two transaction networks. Figure 2 shows 
the results. The elements on both axes are firms listed in the same order, and the dots represent 
transactions. If firm j is a customer of firm i, we put a dot in the cell (i, j) of the matrix. In the 
automotive DSM, for example, dot (359, 524) indicates that Nippon Denso (firm 524) is a 
customer of Arai Seisakusho (firm 359). In the electronics DSM, dot (147, 124) indicates that 
Omron (firm 124) is a customer of Matsushita Electric Industrial (firm 147, since renamed 
Panasonic). 
 
 THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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       A) Automotive Sector                                      B) Electronics Sector 
Figure 2 Dependency Structure Matrices for Japanese interfirm transaction networks in 1993. 
The small boxes drawn inside the DSMs encapsulate strong components (Wassserman and Faust, 1994), in which all nodes are 
on cycles with each other. The automotive sector DSM shows there is only one strong component in the automotive network, and 
its size is (3 nodes, 3 links). In contrast, in the electronics network, there are four strong components, and their sizes are (84 
nodes, 254 links), (3 nodes, 4 links), (2 nodes, 2 links), and (2 nodes, 2 links), respectively. The dots in a row indicate how many 
suppliers the firm in that row has. In DSM A, the dense bottom rows are the large car manufacturers like Toyota and Nissan. No 
such dominance appears in B. 
 
In the DSMs in Figure 2, firms are ordered according to their “visibilities”
7; thus firms on 
connected cycles have been grouped together (MacCormack et al., 2010). In the automotive 
DSM, almost all dots are below the main diagonal, indicating that this network is extremely 
hierarchical. In contrast, the electronics DSM has many dots above the diagonal, indicating that 
many firms participate in transaction cycles. Furthermore, most of these cycles are intertwined 
together in one strongly connected “component” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). That component, 
which appears as the large block near the center of Figure 2, encapsulates 84 firms (37% of the 
total) and 254 links (39% of the transactional relationships). All firms in this component 
participate in transaction cycles with each other, and thus the network is far from being purely 
hierarchical. 
The comparison of the two DSMs in Figure 2 reveals significant qualitative differences in 
hierarchy in the two sectors. We now use the Luo and Magee (2011) metric, described earlier, to 
quantify the differences. 
                                                 
7  “Visibility” is the count of all the direct and indirect dependencies a node possesses with other nodes 
(MacCormack et al., 2006).   THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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4.4 Hierarchy Measurement 
We computed the hierarchy metric, h, for the Japanese electronics transaction network in 
1993 and the automotive transaction networks in 1983, 1993, and 2001. Table 3 shows the 
number of firms involved in cycles and the degree of hierarchy (h) for each network. A 
comparison for 1993 shows that the electronics sector (h=0.5957) is quantitatively much less 
hierarchical than the automotive sector (h=0.9988) because of the presence of many transaction 
cycles. Furthermore, the degree of hierarchy in the automotive sector in Japan did not change 
much over time. (Unfortunately, we did not have corresponding data for the electronics sector.) 
 
Table 3 Cycles and Hierarchy in Two Sectors 
Network Attributes  Japanese Automotive Sector 
Japanese Electronics 
Sector 
complete 
network 
10 largest 
firms 
removed 
Year  1983  1993  2001  1993  1993 
Number of Firms in Cycles (nc)  4  3  2  91  13 
Number of Links in Cycles (mc)  4  3  2  262  14 
Degree of Hierarchy (h=1- mc/ /m)  0.9973  0.9988  0.9991  0.5957  0.9367 
Cycle Tracking  2 two-node 
cycles 
1 three-node 
cycle 
1 two-node 
cycle  many*  7 two-node 
cycles 
* In the 1993 electronics sector network, there were 51 two-node cycles, 12 three-node cycles, 92 four-node cycles, 107 
five-node cycles, 598 six-node cycles, and many larger cycles. There were four strong components in which all nodes are in 
cycles with each other. These four strong components are shown as boxes in the electronics sector DSM in Figure 5. 
 
 
4.5 Transaction Cycles 
The automotive transaction network is very hierarchical, and thus it is clear which firms 
are “upstream” and which are “downstream.” In this sector, only one or two small cycles were 
found in the network in any year, and in all years the transactions involved in cycles were of only 
minor volume.
8  Figure 3 shows the only cycle present in 1993. In the early 2000s, that cycle 
                                                 
8  The Dodwell data for the auto part industry has some but incomplete information about the portion of procurement THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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disappeared as Toyota Auto Body acquired the other two firms (Araco and Gifu Auto Body 
Industry).   
 
• major products: vehicle assembly (trucks, buses, specialty vehicles, etc) 50%, 
seating, door trims, and roof linings 50%
• customers: Toyota 98.4%, Daihatsu motor 0.2%, Toyota Auto Body 0.1%
• major products: car assembly 84% (passenger cars 45%, commercial vehicles 
31%, trucks 8%), auto parts, etc. 16%
• customers: Toyota Motor, Toyota Tsusho, Gifu Auto Body Industry
this link disappeared after 1993
• major products: bodies for trucks, specialty vehicles 64%, pressed auto parts 
(seat adjuster, radiator baffles, door trims) 31%, others, 5%
• customers: Toyota Motor 90%, Takashimaya Nippatsu Kogyo 3%, Toyota 
Shatai 1%, Dahatsu Motor 1%, Araco
Toyota Auto Body Co Ltd (TA) acquired the vehicle manufacturing and sales business of Araco Corp (AR), a 
manufacturer of automotive seat cover, and a unit of Toyota Motor Corp (TM) – announced on October 1st, 2004
Toyota Auto Body Co Ltd (TA) acquired the remaining 89.09% interest of Gifu Auto Body Co Ltd, a manufacturer 
of automobile and truck bodies – announced on October 1st, 2007
Araco
ToyotaAuto Body
Gifu Auto Body Industry
 
Figure 3 The only cycle in the automotive sector in 1993 
 
In contrast, approximately 40% of the transactional relationships in the electronics sector 
in 1993 were involved in cycles, including 51 two-node cycles, 12 three-node cycles, and many 
larger cycles. Figure 4 presents two examples extracted from the data. In one case, Fujitsu 
purchased components and power units from Shindengen Electric Manufacturing for use in its 
personal computer, server, and system products, and then supplied computer, server, and system 
products to Shindengen Electric. In another case, Matsushita Electric Industrial (now Panasonic) 
sold components to Matsushita Electric Works, which sold materials for making electronic 
boards to CMK. CMK, in turn, was a supplier of printed circuit board (PCB) assemblies to 
Matsushita Electric Industrial. (As indicated in the caption, Matsushita Electric Industrial was a 
significant shareholder of Matsushita Electric Works, which was in turn a minor shareholder in 
CMK. Cross-holding of shares is a feature of the keiretsu system and is common among 
Japanese corporations (Aoki, 1988). In general, we treated firms as separate if the major 
shareholder owned less than 50% of outstanding shares. Note, however, that if we treat 
                                                                                                                                                             
from each of the major suppliers that a customer firm lists. Fortunately, we can find such information for the firms 
involved in these cycles in the automotive networks, but not for all the firms. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
  15  1
5 
Matsushita Electric Industrial and Matsushita Electric Works as one firm, a cycle persists 
between Matsushita and CMK. We discuss the keiretsu system in relation to our findings in 
Section 6.) 
 
Fujitsu Shindengen Electric Mfg
Components, Power Units
PC, Server, Systems
 
A)  An example of 2-node cycle 
 
CMK Matsushita Electric Works
Materials for boards
Matsushita Electric Industrial
(Panasonic)
PCB 
Assemblies
Components
 
B) An example of 3-node cycle 
Figure 4 Example cycles found in the electronics transaction network 
Note: Fujitsu owned a 7.2% share of Shindengen Electric Mfg in 1992. Matsushita Electric Industrial owned a 32.5% share of 
Matsushita Electric Works, and Matsushita Electric Works owned a 3.6% share of CMK in 1992. Information on what was 
transacted was described to one of the authors (Luo) by managers at Fujitsu and Panasonic, respectively, based on their 
knowledge of the firms’ business in the early 1990s. 
 
Thus the electronics transaction network is only partially hierarchical. Inside the strongly 
connected component of the network (the large central block in Figure 2B), it is not clear which 
firms are “upstream” and which are “downstream.” Hence this network is a counterexample to 
Nakano and D. White’s (2007) hypothesis that hierarchy is a general property of transaction 
networks in production markets.   
 
5 What Hierarchy and Cycles Reveal about the Practices of Firms 
The differences observed in the hierarchy of the two transaction networks help expand 
our knowledge of industry architecture and complement prior empirical studies in economic 
sociology. The value of this knowledge for management scholars, however, is limited unless 
facts about network architecture can be linked to the practices of firms in important ways. In this 
section, we ask the following question: What does the presence of hierarchy or cycles in a THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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transaction network reveal about the practices of firms in that network?   
In a purely hierarchical transaction network, firms occupy well-defined positions with 
respect to one another. Firm A is either upstream from Firm B (a direct or indirect supplier), 
downstream from Firm B (a direct or indirect customer), or unrelated (neither a supplier nor a 
customer). In contrast, in a non-hierarchical transaction network, some firms by definition 
participate in transaction cycles. And for transaction cycles to exist, some firms in the industry 
must have two-way vertically permeable boundaries. Such firms concurrently source and sell; 
that is, (1) they participate in multiple stages of industry value chains, but also (2) they both 
purchase inputs for downstream units from other firms in the sector (concurrent sourcing) and 
sell outputs from upstream units to other firms in the sector (concurrent selling).
9   
In Figure 5, for example, Firm A in the electronics sector makes substrates (a 
component), chipsets (a subsystem), and entire systems.
10  Internally, its substrate unit transfers 
goods to the chipset unit, which in turn transfers goods to the systems unit. But the substrate unit 
also sells products to Firm B, a specialized chipset maker, while the systems unit purchases 
chipsets from that firm. 
 
Firm A
Systems
Subsystems
Components
Subsystems
Firm B
Chipsets
Package 
Substrates
Market 
Transaction
Internal 
Transfer
Firm Intermediate Products / Processes
 
Figure 5 Vertically permeable boundary and interfirm transaction cycle. 
 
                                                 
9  Our definition of concurrent sourcing/selling considers all of the focal firm’s transactional relations with other 
firms in the sector, hence is slightly broader than (although consistent with) the definition used in firm-level studies, 
which focus on individual components (see, for example, Parmigiani, 2007).   
10  This is a real example, which was described to one of the authors (Luo) by an industry participant in 2009. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Thus Firm A has two-way vertically permeable boundaries. It is vertically integrated in 
the sense that goods flow from division to division within the firm, but at the same time its 
downstream division buys inputs from external suppliers in the sector and its upstream division 
sells outputs to external customers in the sector. Note that although Firms A and B both 
participate in the same cycle, only Firm A, by our definition, has vertically permeable 
boundaries. Thus Firm A is critical to the cycle. If, for whatever reason, Firm A stopped 
outsourcing chipsets or selling substrates, the cycle would disappear. In other words, specialized 
firms (like Firm B) cannot instigate cycles unless a firm with broader scope (like Firm A) both 
sells to them and buys from them, either directly or indirectly. As such, a sector made up of only 
specialized firms like Firm B will be purely hierarchical. 
Figure 6 shows another way in which two-way vertically permeable boundaries can give 
rise to transaction cycles.
11  Here Firms C and D have internal divisions that participate in the 
upstream and downstream stages of different value chains within the same sector. For example, 
Firm C might make printed circuit boards (a subsystem) and television sets (a system), while 
Firm D makes flat panel displays (a subsystem) and computers (a system). In this hypothetical 
example, there are no product flows between the subsystem and system divisions within each 
firm, but both firms are present in different stages of technologically related value chains. Firm C 
sells printed circuit boards (PCBs) to Firm D and purchases flat panel displays from it, and thus a 
transaction cycle exists between the two firms. And both firms, by our definition, have two-way 
vertically permeable boundaries.
12   
 
                                                 
11  This is a hypothetical example. Cycles like this are theoretically possible but they did not arise in our data from 
the 10 largest firms in the electronics sector. Whether they exist at all is an open empirical question, but we include 
this case for completeness. 
12  Transaction cycles can also arise across sectors if some firms adopt a strategy of unrelated diversification. The 
incidence of cross-sector cycles depends on the prevalence of business groups made up of technologically unrelated 
divisional units. Investigating such patterns is an interesting topic for future research. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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Market 
Transaction
Firm Intermediate Products / Processes
Firm D
System 1 System 2
Subsystems for 2
Firm C
Subsystems for 1 PCB
Flat Panel 
Display
Computers  Television Sets
 
Figure 6 Vertically permeable boundaries and interfirm transaction cycle: a different example. 
 
We formalize the relationship between transaction cycles and vertically permeable 
boundaries in the following way: Any inter-firm transaction cycle must include at least one firm 
that concurrently sources and sells, hence whose vertical boundaries are permeable in both 
directions. Therefore, an observable aspect of a transaction network’s structure, specifically the 
presence or absence of cycles, can reveal a key fact about firms in the sector, i.e., whether a 
subset of firms has two-way vertically permeable boundaries. Finally, it is important to recognize 
that a small number of firms with two-way vertically permeable boundaries can involve many 
other firms in transaction cycles.   
Returning to the empirical results in section 4, we can now assert that some firms in the 
electronics sector have two-way vertically permeable boundaries. But the question becomes, 
which firms?   
 
5.1 The Largest Firms 
On further examination, we found that most of the two- and three-firm cycles in the 
electronics sector included at least one of the 10 largest firms (see Table 1). Thus we 
hypothesized that the largest firms play a critical role in forming cycles in this sector. We tested 
this hypothesis by removing these firms from the sector’s transaction network. The results are 
shown in the last column of Table 3. In the new network without the largest firms, only 13 of the 
other firms participated in cycles (down from 91), while just 14 out of 221 links were in cycles 
(resulting in h=0.9367). Thus a relatively small group of firms (the 10 largest) played a major THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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role in determining the architecture of this transaction network. 
Pursuing this observation, we further compared the two sectors with regard to the largest 
firms’ network positions and links with each other. First, we found that the largest firms were 
located differently in their respective transaction networks. As shown in Table 1, the largest 
automotive firms (such as Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and Mitsubishi) had no customers within the 
sector although they had many suppliers. Essentially, they were final assemblers and systems 
integrators located in the most downstream positions of the value chain. They might have 
concurrently sourced components from both internal units and external suppliers,
13  but they did 
not sell intermediate goods to other firms in their sector — at least not in significant volumes. 
(Our data books list only the “major” customers and suppliers of a firm; thus small transactions 
may have been omitted.) 
In contrast, in the electronics sector, some of the largest firms (such as Matsushita 
Electric, Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, and Fujitsu) had the highest numbers of customers and the 
highest numbers of suppliers. These firms bought components from external suppliers for their 
system products, and they also sold products from their component divisions to other firms in the 
sector. Thus these firms were located in the middle of the (partial) hierarchy of the electronics 
transaction network. Indeed, all but one (Canon) was located in the strongly connected 
component (see Figure 2B). 
Thus nine of the 10 largest electronics firms were reciprocally linked by transactions. 
One further question then arises: Did those firms buy and sell directly or indirectly? When we 
investigated this question, we found only one direct link between the nine firms: from Hitachi to 
Sharp. In other words, the largest electronics firms did not transact directly with each other; 
instead, they were cyclically connected through chains of transactions. The absence of direct 
transactions suggests that other cycle participants (either customers or suppliers) played 
intermediary roles within the architecture of this sector. 
Finally, when we further traced the transactional relationships of the largest firms, we 
found evidence of significant network sharing in both sectors. For example, 97% of Toyota’s 
direct suppliers also sold (either directly or indirectly) to at least one other large firm in the 
sector. In other words, only 3% (5 out of 166 firms) dealt exclusively with Toyota.
14  The same 
                                                 
13  Concurrent sourcing is a common practice of automotive manufacturers (Fine and Whitney, 1999). 
14  As of March 1993, a 15.8% stake of Daihatsu and 11.2% stake of Hino were held by Toyota. Daihatsu and Hino THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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pattern was observed for the other nine largest firms (see Table 4).   
 
Table 4 Supplier Sharing in the Automotive Sector 
Largest firms by 
revenue 
Number of 
direct 
suppliers 
Portion of direct 
suppliers that also 
directly supply to any 
other of the largest 10 
firms 
Portion of direct 
suppliers that 
indirectly supply to 
any other of the 
largest 10 firms 
Sum: Direct plus 
Indirect 
Toyota Motor  166  86%  11%  97% 
Nissan Motor  176  86%  10%  96% 
Mitsubishi Motor  226  77%  18%  95% 
Mazda Motor  157  78%  12%  90% 
Honda Motor  169  75%  12%  87% 
Suzuki Motor  125  83%  9%  92% 
Daihatsu Motor  99  85%  8%  93% 
Fuji Heavy Industries  127  83%  7%  90% 
Isuzu Motors  135  82%  11%  93% 
Hino Motors  98  79%  13%  92% 
Average   147.8  82%  11%  93% 
 
 
There was also a high level of supplier sharing in the electronics sector (see Table 5). 
Fully 100% of the largest 10 firms’ direct suppliers also sold (either directly or indirectly) to the 
other firms in the top 10. In other words, even though the top 10 firms did not transact with each 
other directly, their supply networks overlapped. Moreover, the same pattern was true for 
customers: For nine of the 10 largest firms, every customer had a direct or indirect relationship 
with at least one other firm in the top 10. (Again, the exception was Canon.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
were specialized in small/mini cars and trucks/buses respectively, and were considered member firms of the Toyota 
Group. We tested if grouping of them has a strong effect on the result by making Toyota, Daihatsu, and Hino into 
one node (Toyota group). “Toyota Group” had 246 direct suppliers, and 89% of them directly or indirectly supplied 
at least one other large firm in the sector. This grouping did not change the results for other firms. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
  21  2
1 
Table 5 Supplier and Customer Sharing in the Electronics Sector 
A) Supplier Sharing 
Largest firms by 
revenue 
Number of 
direct 
suppliers 
Portion of direct suppliers 
that also directly supply 
to any other of the largest 
10 firms 
Portion of direct 
suppliers that indirectly 
supply to any other of 
the largest 10 firms 
Sum: Direct plus 
Indirect 
Hitachi  52  79%  21%  100% 
Matsushita   30  73%  27%  100% 
Toshiba  40  75%  25%  100% 
Sony  36  89%  11%  100% 
NEC  38  61%  39%  100% 
Fujitsu  34  85%  15%  100% 
Mitsubishi Electric  33  91%  9%  100% 
Canon  9  89%  11%  100% 
Sanyo Electric  15  87%  13%  100% 
Sharp  23  83%  17%  100% 
Average   31  81%  19%  100% 
 
B) Customer Sharing 
Largest firms by 
revenue 
Number of 
direct 
customers 
Portion of direct 
customers that also 
directly purchase from 
any other of the largest 10 
firms 
Portion of direct 
customers that 
indirectly purchase 
from any other of the 
largest 10 firms 
Sum: Direct 
plus Indirect 
Hitachi  17  47%  53%  100% 
Matsushita   27  41%  59%  100% 
Toshiba  26  46%  54%  100% 
Sony  3  33%  67%  100% 
NEC  18  44%  56%  100% 
Fujitsu  12  50%  50%  100% 
Mitsubishi Electric  7  57%  43%  100% 
Canon  2  50%  0%  50% 
Sanyo Electric  3  100%  0%  100% 
Sharp  3  67%  33%  100% 
Average   11.8  54%  41%  95% 
 
 
If two firms share a supplier or distributor, then they are separated by one degree, 
according to the classic “small worlds” measure (Watts, 1999). Our analysis suggests that, 
because of extensive network sharing, the average degree of separation between firms in these 
two sectors is low, but this remains an open empirical question.   
In summary, the largest firms in the two sectors are similar in that they have overlapping 
supplier networks but rarely transact directly with each other. The firms differ markedly, 
however, in terms of the products they choose to sell. The largest automotive firms rarely sold to 
other firms in their sector, while the largest electronics firms commonly did so. In the next THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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section, we discuss the implications of these findings. 
 
6 Discussion 
Our cross-sector analysis sheds light on prior theories in economic sociology and 
management, and it complements prior empirical work on the structure of alliance networks. It 
also establishes a direct correspondence between the practices of individual firms at the micro 
level and measurable properties of a transaction network at the macro level. 
In economic sociology, H. White (2002a) argued that production markets are socially 
constructed from networks of firms for whom the relationships “upstream” and “downstream” 
are fundamental. Nakano and D. White (2007) went on to hypothesize that transaction networks 
in production markets would exhibit strict hierarchy; i.e., the firms would be strictly ordered 
from upstream to downstream. To test that hypothesis, we used a new metric to measure 
hierarchy of two transaction networks in Japan in 1993. We were able to show that strict 
hierarchy might be characteristic of some but not all transaction networks, thus refuting the 
strong form of the hypothesis.     
In management, Jacobides and Winter (2005) argued that the vertical scope of firms is 
co-determined by heterogeneous capabilities and endogenous transaction costs. Baldwin (2008) 
further argued that transaction costs are lowest at the “thin crossing points” of an underlying 
network of production and knowledge transfers, and that such boundary points are partially 
endogenous. This paper has developed a methodology for observing and comparing transaction 
networks, which are superimposed on more complex networks of goods and knowledge flows in 
the economy. Applying our methodology to the Japanese automotive and electronics sectors in 
1993, we found that both sectors contained densely connected transactions in which exclusive 
relationships (captive suppliers or customers) were not characteristic. This is different from the 
pattern of vertical integration observed by Chandler (1990) in the United States in the late 19
th 
century, where large firms created independent supply chains and distribution channels.   
We were also able to identify differences between the sectors. In general, automotive 
firms almost never sold to firms from whom they purchased goods directly or indirectly. Hence 
this sector displayed nearly absolute hierarchy with almost no transaction cycles (see Table 4 and 
Figure 2). In contrast, in the electronics sector, the largest firms concurrently bought and sold THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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components in transactions with other firms within the sector, in addition to their selling systems 
to end-users. Indeed, nine of the 10 largest firms were part of a single strongly connected 
component (see Figure 2); i.e., they both purchased and sold goods to each another, although 
through indirect relationships. The largest firms were also critical to the architecture of the 
network: When we removed them, the number of cycles dropped significantly and the 
transaction network became substantially more hierarchical (see Table 3). 
Our analysis complements prior work on alliance networks, especially the cross-industry 
comparative analysis of Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007). In their analysis, Rosenkopf and 
Schilling found that the automotive, computer, and communication equipment industries
15  all 
had dense and non-separable alliance networks. Although we looked at data from a different 
country and time, we also found high density and non-separability (in the form of overlapping 
suppliers and distributors) in the transaction networks of these sectors. However, because 
alliance networks contain only non-directed links, hierarchy cannot be established in them. 
Understanding how alliance and transaction networks are related is an interesting avenue for 
future research. (Helper et al., 2000 provide a starting point for this line of work.) 
To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to demonstrate a connection between 
complex boundary decisions by individual firms and macro-level industry structure. It is well 
known that firms’ decisions to integrate or specialize, when widely adopted, lead to vertically 
integrated or horizontally layered industry structures (see, for example, Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Jacobides, 2005; and Fixson and Park, 2008). However, studies at the firm level, starting 
with Harrigan (1985), have shown that the boundary and scope decisions of firms are often more 
complex than simply to integrate or specialize. In particular, firms often practice concurrent 
sourcing (tapered integration) or have two-way vertically permeable boundaries. We have seen 
that, in order for cycles to form in a transaction network, some firms must concurrently source 
and sell intermediate goods; i.e., they must have two-way vertically permeable boundaries. 
However, only a small number of firms need to adopt this practice to have a dramatic effect on 
the architecture of the transaction network. 
What causes the difference in boundary choices of the largest firms in our two sectors? 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to answer that question. Nevertheless, as a prelude to 
                                                 
15  The computer and communications equipment industries in their data roughly correspond to the electronics sector 
in our data. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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further inquiry, we offer two possible explanations, one cultural and the other technological. We 
believe the cultural explanation cannot explain the differences we observe, because the cultural 
context of the two sectors is very similar. The technological explanation takes us further but still 
leaves important questions unanswered.   
On first glance, one might look at the keiretsu business culture in Japan for a possible 
explanation of that country’s transaction networks. A keiretsu is a group of companies with 
long-time interlocking business relationships and shareholdings (Sako, 1992; Nishiguchi, 1994; 
Paprzycki, 2005; Nagaoka et al., 2008). In fact, our data show that many of the direct suppliers 
of the 10 largest firms in the automotive sector are keiretsu members, as are many customers and 
“cycle partners” of the 10 largest firms in the electronic sector. But transaction cycles only arose 
widely in the electronics sector. Thus, the keiretsu business culture, which is present in both 
sectors, cannot by itself explain the differences in hierarchy. 
From interviews with key managers in the automotive sector, we learned that virtually 
every component must be designed specifically for the system in which it will function (Luo, 
2010). This was true in the automotive sector during the time of our data; and it remains true 
today. As a result, supplier-customer relations in this sector have generally taken the form of 
long-term relational contracts with high levels of interaction and joint problem-solving 
(Asanuma, 1989; Sako, 1992; Nishiguchi, 1994; Baldwin, 2008; Nagaoka et al., 2008). 
Inevitably, to get the various components to work together properly, suppliers and customers 
must share knowledge and, because of that, a big concern is that valuable knowledge may leak 
out to customers that are also competitors (Baldwin and Henkel, 2011; Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). 
At the same time, external sales of components do not generate significant economies of scale, 
because each component is specialized to a particular system. Taken together, the risk of 
knowledge spillovers to competitors and the lack of economies of scale reduce the incentives of 
vertically integrated automotive companies to sell internally manufactured components to other 
firms in their sector. 
In the electronics sector, the situation is much different because the risks of knowledge 
spillovers are substantially lower and the potential economies of scale are higher. Here 
components are modular black boxes, whose internal structure can be concealed behind 
standardized interfaces (Whitney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Such components can be 
recombined in many different types of systems (e.g., computers, TVs, and mobile phones), and THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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thus potential economies of scale are high. Indeed, if the component division of a vertically 
integrated electronics firm supplies only its in-house divisions, it may not be able to achieve 
minimum efficient scale. By selling components to external customers, component divisions can 
increase their production volumes and thus be cost-competitive with vertically specialized firms. 
(Note that, in our data, the component divisions of the largest firms never sold directly to other 
large firms. Whether their components indirectly found their way into the systems of competitors 
is an open question.) 
But all that raises another question: In the presence of high levels of component 
modularity and innovation, why should firms in the electronics industry remain vertically 
integrated at all? Since the mid-1990s, the ratio of component sales to overall sales for the largest 
Japanese electronics firms has been stable and significant: in the range of 12% to 24% (Luo, 
2010, pp.114-5). Vertical integration by the largest firms thus appears to be a stable feature of 
the industry’s overall architecture. What explains it?   
As indicated in the literature review, prior studies have shown that systems integrators 
need to maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities along the value chain and that firms that 
outsource components may ultimately lose control of critical component knowledge (Fine and 
Whitney, 1999; Brusoni et al., 2001; Davies, 2004; Ceci and Masini, 2011; Kapoor, 2011). In our 
interviews, managers in the electronics sector in Japan stated their belief that detailed knowledge 
of the technologies within key components was a source of competitive advantage in designing 
system-level products. Such knowledge, they maintained, was more readily obtained from 
in-house divisions than from external suppliers (Luo, 2010).   
Overall, this knowledge-based explanation of vertical integration is in line with previous 
foundational work on knowledge-based sector specificities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 
1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Malerba, 2002). The argument is that 
the features of a sector’s technological base in conjunction with firms’ scope decisions tend to 
shape the firms’ innovation opportunities. Consistent with this view, the managers we 
interviewed asserted that the largest Japanese electronics firms have remained vertically 
integrated to maintain access to component-level knowledge, which in turn has benefited their 
system-level innovation opportunities.   
 THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literatures on industry architecture and the sociology of 
markets by investigating the transaction networks of two large sectors in Japan at a single point 
in time. In this investigation, our primary lens was “hierarchy,” defined as the degree to which 
transactions in the network flow in one direction, from “upstream” to “downstream.” We showed 
that the Japanese electronics sector exhibits a much lower degree of hierarchy than the 
automotive sector because it contains numerous inter-firm transaction cycles. Furthermore, we 
traced the observed differences in hierarchy to differences in the largest firms’ practices with 
respect to two-way vertically permeable boundaries and component sales within the sector.   
Like all studies, this one has certain limitations. First, because of the difficulty of 
obtaining good transactions data, we were able to analyze only two sectors in the same country 
in the same year (1993). Data for other sectors with different technological bases, cultures (e.g. 
American, European, or Chinese), and in different stages of industry evolution would have 
provided a better test of our empirical results and theoretical reasoning. It is difficult, however, to 
collect sector-wide data on transactions because many firms are unwilling to share information 
on their suppliers and customers. In time, we hope that new data sources will become available. 
Because of a lack of data, this study could not address questions involving sector 
dynamics. The network architectures we observed might have been transient, non-equilibrium 
patterns. This is more likely to be a problem in the electronics sector, for which we had only a 
snapshot year (1993), than in the automotive sector, for which we had three observations 
spanning 18 years (1983-2001). 
This paper opens up several avenues of potential future research. First, there are 
opportunities to extend the methodology. To gain a better understanding of transaction networks, 
it is necessary to look beyond simple cycle counts to cycle location, the presence of strongly 
connected components, and the degrees of separation between competing firms. Recent work by 
MacCormack et al. (2010) investigates some of these methodological questions. 
Second, there is an opportunity to integrate transaction network analysis with ongoing 
empirical work on sectors. Specifically, as supply networks become more extensive and 
far-flung, there is a growing need for transaction network analysis to inform public policy. As 
one example, in 2009, General Motors and Chrysler received government financial support based 
largely on the claim that their failure would have imposed great cost on their domestic supply THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTION NETWORKs 
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chains. But no information was publicly disclosed regarding the identities of their direct or 
indirect suppliers or the extent of their supply networks. In this case, transaction network 
analysis could have provided useful information to inform public policy. Other potential 
applications of transaction network analysis include the assessment of credit risk, product safety, 
and the security of supply networks for defense. Finally, investigating the relationships between 
transaction networks and alliance networks offers an opportunity to develop a better 
understanding of the flows of goods and knowledge within a sector and the ways in which those 
flows are related. 
We also see an opportunity to use transaction network data to shed light on firm 
strategies. Such work must bridge the firm and sector levels of analysis. One example of that is 
with respect to vertical integration. Kapoor (2011) has hypothesized that, as industries become 
more vertically specialized, new opportunities emerge for the remaining vertically integrated 
firms to focus on system-level innovations. This hypothesis is consistent with our explanation, 
gleaned from interviews, as to why large electronics firms in Japan have remained vertically 
integrated. At the same time, our findings on two-way vertically permeable boundaries may 
explain how vertically integrated firms remain competitive in sectors with high rates of 
component innovation. Another example is with respect to the different roles that firms can play. 
In the electronics sector, we found that, even though nine of the 10 largest firms were part of a 
single cyclic group (strongly connected component), they almost never directly bought or sold to 
each other. Hence the sector must have contained firms that served as intermediaries between the 
largest firms. Identifying such firms and exploring their roles and strategies is an open avenue for 
future work that would combine network and firm-level data.   
In conclusion, we hope this paper will be seen as an invitation for further exploration of 
transaction networks and their architecture in a wide range of settings.   
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